Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 10

Number 2

Article 4

December 2019

Liability of Chiropractors for Malpractice
Jerald E. Dukes

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Jerald E. Dukes, Liability of Chiropractors for Malpractice, 10 WYO. L.J. 124 (1956)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol10/iss2/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

\YoMING LAW JOURNAL

in their agreements with the mortgagor of premises as against a prior
mortgagor so long as removal does not do substantial damage to the
premises. And parties to a sale and mortgage may agree to make whatever
personality is included in the mortgage real property for the purpose of
the mortgage.
MYRON HOWARD

LIABILITY OF CHIROPRACTORS FOR MALPRACTICE
Since the days of Hippocrates, there has been a constant struggle
between the "regular" and "non-regular" medical practitioners. The
rivalry which exists today between regular physicians and surgeons and the
osteopath, the chiropractor, the naturopath, the Christian Science healer,
the clairvoyant physician, and those of various other schools of healing is
but a repetition of the rivalry between the allopath and the homeopath,
the physio-medic, the eclectic, and the botanic physicians of 175 years ago.'
Since the founding of the American School of Osteopathy by Dr. A. T. Still
in Kansas in 1872 and the school of chiropractic by D. D. Palmer in Iowa
in 1894 these two healing schools have steadily intruded themselves into
the field of medicine.2 Many legislatures have felt that such schools
have a place in the modern art of healing, and now every state in the Union
and the District of Columbia provide for the licensing of osteopaths, and
all except Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, Massachusetts and Texas provide for the licensing of chiropractors as such. 3
This article will be limited to a discussion of the liability of chiropractors in malpractice actions for failures in the diagnosis or treatment of
serious disorders such as diphtheria, diabetes, heart conditions and fractures, and also cases of alleged malpractice in the treatment of sore backs,
dislocated vertebrae and similar disorders which are usually considered
by the public as within the field of chiropractic practice. The article will
be directed mainly to the standard of care of the chiropractor but will
include some other aspects of the broader question of liability for malpractice. The liability of members of other schools of drugless healing
will be only incidentally considered. The question of the liability of a
chiropractor acting as an operator of an X-ray machine presents special
problems and will not be discussed.
1.

2.

3.

In Fishbein, The New Medical Follies (1927), there is listed in Chapter I, An
Encylopedia of Cults and Quackeries, an alphabetical list of cults numbering sixtythree, from "aerotherapy" to "zodiac therapy." Since the publication of that book
numerous other cults have appeared. See also, Caldwell, Early Legislation Regulat(1923).
ing the Practice of Medicine, 18 Ill. L. Rev. 225
In Reed, The Healing Cults (A. M. A. pamphlet, 1932) it is stated that the A. M. A.
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care estimated that as of 1932, in the United
States as a whole, for every ten physicians there was one chiropractor. Wyoming
had one chiropractor for every two physicians, for the highest ratio; and Wyoming
was second only to California in the ratio of chiropractors to population. In Boyd,
The Cult of Chiropractic (1953), published by the Louisiana State Medical Society,
it is estimated that in 1952 there were 20,000 chiropractors in the United States.
Memorandum, Bureau of Legal Medicine and Legislation, American Medical
Association (1950).

Nomrs
Before considering any cases or rules pertaining to chiropractic, it is
necessary to attempt to define the term itself. A Utah court has given
the following definition: Chiropractic is the system of therapeutic treatment of various diseases, through adjusting of articulations of the human
body, particularly those of the spine, with the object of relieving pressure
or tension on nerve filaments by operations performed with the hands, and
without administration of drugs; a system of manipulation which aims to
cure disease by the mechanical restoration of displaced or subluxated
bones, especially the vertebrae, to their normal relation.4 The Wyoming
statute has a similar definition as follows: "Chiropractic is a method of
palpation, nerve tracing and adjustment of vertebrae and other tissue for
relief of morbid conditions. 'Chiropractic' is the science that teaches
health in anatomic relation and disease or abnormality in anatomic disrelation, and teaches the act of restoring anatomic relation by process of
adjusting."5 In other words, the chiropractic theory is that all diseases
and illnesses are due to one cause-slight dislocation of one or more of
the spinal vertebrae. When such "subluxations" occur, the theory runs,
the apertures between the vertebrae through which the nerve branches issue
from the spinal cord are narrowed and there is pressure upon the nerve or
nerves in question. Such pressure prevents the nerve from doing its work
properly, and disease then results in the organ or part which the nerve
activates. Following this theory, fundamentalist chiropractors believe that
no necessity exists for making a medical diagnosis since all diseases are
caused by dislocated vertebrae. Confronted with a sick person, the
chiropractor has only to discover by palpation or nerve tracing (tracing
of subcutaneous nerves by means of tender spots), the vertebrae which are
out of position. These he "adjusts" and when he has returned them to
the normal position, the cure will follow automatically.
Many principles of law which govern the relation of a regular medical
practitioner to his patient also apply to the chiropractor. 6 He is bound to
exercise the reasonable skill and care possessed and exercised by other
7
practitioners, generally of his own school, in the same community or area.
The chiropractor is not an insurer, nor does he warrant favorable results in
the absence of a special contract.8 The mere failure to effect a cure does not
raise a presumption of a want of proper care, skill and diligence.9 In order
to enable the patient to recover against the chiropractor for malpractice,
the negligence of such practioner must have been the proximate cause of
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 37-704 (1945). But see Boyd, The Cult of Chiropractic (1953):
"It is impossible to define chiropractic accurately because it has no fixed meaning.
It is not a name given to a definite method of diagnosis and treatment. In the
different states in which chiropractic is licensed the definition of what they can
do and what they are supposed to do mean different things."
Treptau v. Behrens Spa, 247 Wis. 438, 20 N.W.2d 108, 19 N.C.C.A. N.S. 1 (1945).
Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159, 25 N.C.C.A. 248 (1925); Howe v.
McCoy, 113 CaI.App. 468, 298 Pac. 530 (1931).
Abos v. Martyn, 31 Cal.App.2d 705, 88 P.2d 797 (1939).
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937).

N'VYO7MING

LAW JOURNAL

the patient's injury." ' A mere error in judgment does not render a chirA patient may be barred from
opractor liable in a malpractice action."
recovery for the negligence of a chiropractor under the doctrine of con2
tributory negligence.'
The basic rule governing the liability of chiropractors is that drugless
healers are entitled to be judged according to the standards of the school of
healing which they profess to follow. However, apart from such rules as
apply alike to regular medical practitioners and chiropractors, the law
concerning the liability of the latter is in a somewhat confusing state. The
variance of rules in different jurisdictions as to the standard of care of
3
the chiropractor seems partly due to differences in the licensing statutes,'
and also due in part to refusals by some courts to follow the general rule
that the drugless healer is entitled to be tested by the rules and principles
of the school to which he belongs.
Recognition of the liability of a chiropractor for a failure to exercise
the requisite skill in treatment of the patient's disorders has been accorded
in a large number of cases. The law on this subject is not as confusing as in
the cases where liability is sought to be predicated under negligence in
diagnosis; apparently the "school of healing" standard does not pose such
a problem in cases involving negligent treatment. Thus, a chiropractor has
been held liable for negligence in applying a cast to a fracture,' 4 for
manipulating the spine of a patient with high blood pressure who died from
a cerebral hemorrhage,1 5 for negligence in diathermy treatment resulting in
burns, 16 and in treatment by surgery of a patient with hemorrhoids.' 7 The
last-mentioned decision was based on the generally accepted rule that when
10.

11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

The evidence as to
Willett v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.2d 457 (1938).
causation was held to be sufficient in Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197.
44 A.L.R. 1407, 25 N.C.C.A. 227 (1926) where the plaintiff gave testimony, although
contradicted by other witnesses, that the paralysis from which she suffered was
produced by the chiropractic treatments.
Chesney v. People, 121 Colo. 73, 212 P.2d 1011 (1949), noted, 22 Rocky Mtn. L.
Rev. 212 (1950).
But see Kelly v. Carroll,
Minis v. Ragland, 59 Ga.App. 703, 2 S.E.2d 174 (1939).
36 Wash.2d 482, 219 P.2d 79, 19 A.L.R.2d 1174 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892
(1950), holding that the patient was not guilty of contributory negligence; the
court being of the opinion that it would require an unusual state of facts to render
a person possessed of no medical skill guilty of contributory negligence because he
accepted the word of his drugless healer and trusted in the efficacy of the treatment
prescribed by him.
Note, 22 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 212 (1950).
Wallace v. La Vine, 36 Cal.App.2d 450, 97 P.2d 879 (1940).
Deward v. Whitney, 298 Mass. 41, 9 N.E.2d 369 (1937). Defendant admitted that
his school advocated refusal to "take on patients with that ailment (high blood
pressure) because it was too dangerous." But note that this case apparently follows
the Massachusetts rule laid down in Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass. 40, 158
N.E. 270, 57 A.L.R. 974, that violation of the statute by undertaking to give medical
treatment without a license is in itself a substantive ground of liability for iniuries
proximately resulting from the treatment.
Hansen v, Isaak, remanded to trial court in 70 S.D. 529, 19 N.W.2d 521 (1945),
resulting in judgment for the plaintiff; rehearing denied 72 S.D. 311, 33 N.W.2d
561 (1948).
Mims v. Ragland, 59 Ga.App. 703, 2 S.E.2d 174 (1939), where there was evidence
that the chiropratcor had used an unsterilized razor blade in operating on the
patient.

NOTES

a chiropractor employs a method of treatment which is outside the scope
of chiropractic practice and within the realm of medicine or surgery, he
thereby assumes to act as a doctor of medicine and will be held to the
standard of care of such doctor. In the other cases it can be seen that
although the methods of treatment were within the scope of chiropractic
practice, the defendants were nonetheless negligent under the standards
of their own school of healing; and even other chiropractors would probably
testify that the defendants' lack of skill and care was a violation of the
principles of chiropratic practice. In a few cases liability against a chiropractor has been successfully predicated on the ground that treatment was
unduly violent; and here again, as with the cases last-discussed, the courts
can find negligence and still apply the standards of the chiropractic school
of healing. Thus, one court affirmed a judgment against a chiropractor
where there was substantial evidence other than expert testimony that a
fracture of the plaintiff's rib was the result of the chiropractor's negligence
in giving spinal adjustments after diagnosing her condition as tic douloureux, an inflammation of the fifth cranial nerve, which originates in the
brain and has absolutely no connetcion with the vertebrae.15 Recently
a chiropractor was held liable in a wrongful death action in which there
was expert testimony that the cause of death was injury to the patient's
spinal cord coverings resulting in intraspinal bleeding, compression ,of the
spinal cord, spinal concussion and shock. The court held that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the jury that the proximate
cause of the injury was the defendant's violent "manipulations" of the
patient's spine. a9
The recent Washington case of Carney v. Lydon, 20 although involving
liability of a sanipractor, may be important on the question of liability of
chiropractors for negligent treatment. In that case, after a verdict for the
plaintiff the trial court rendered a judgment n. o. v., basing its judgment
on the rule that negligence of a regular medical practitioner is not established where doctors of "equal skill and learning" disagree as to the
propriety of the defendant's method of treatment.2 ' The trial court held
that the same rule applied, -by analogy, to all practitioners of the healing
arts. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered judgment on the verdict,
holding that "the analogy does not apply to a drugless healer because he is
restricted by statute to that which is permitted him tinder the license
issued to him." The rule of this case, then, is that when healers of equal
skill and learning, and of the defendant's own school of healing, express
18.
19.
20.

21.

Morrison v. Lane, 10 Cal.App.2d 634, 52 P.2d 530 (1935).
York v. Daniels, 259 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. 1953).
36 NVash.2d 878, 220 P.2d 894 (1950), noted 49 Mich. L. Rev. 774 (1951), 27 Wash.
L. Rev. 38 (1952).
The plaintiff, a victim of diabetes, went to the defendant,
licensed as a drugless healer, for treatment. The defendant informed her that he
could treat diabetes without the aid of insulin or other drugs. He prescribed a
diet for the plaintiff and gave instructions for the taking of baths. Following the
defendant's advice, the plaintiff's condition became so serious that she finally had
to be admitted to a hospital for insulin treatments in order to save her life.
Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wash.2d 14, 163 P.2d 148 (1945).
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contrary opinions as to the propriety of the defendant drugless healer's
methods of treatment, the jury may, nevertheless, find the defendant
negligent by accepting the opinions of those healers expressing disapproval
of the defendant's methods and rejecting the opposing opinions. It seems
reasonable to assume other courts may apply this rule in cases in which the
defendant healer is a chiropractor.
In cases involving alleged negligence in diagnosis of the patient's ailment there is considerable variance in the decisions as to the standard of
care to be'applied. In a few cases it has been held or recognized that
liability can be predicated upon the negligence of a chiropractor in the
diagnosis of the ailment of his patient even though the "school of healing"
rule purportedly is followed.
In Janssen v. Mulder, 2 2 the defendant
undertook to treat a child suffering from diphtheria. In the wrongful
death action which followed, the defendant admitted he had no experience
in making bacteriological examinations, would be unable to tell diphtheria
from typhoid fever, could not state the symptons of tonsilities (the disease
which the defendant had stated was the cause of the child's fever, according
to the mother's testimony) and had not taken the child's temperature.
The defendant testified that he had merely "adjusted" one vertebrae of the
patient's spine and he stated, "We do not diagnose." The court held the
defendant liable in failing or neglecting to ascertain the nature of the
child's ailment before treating her.2 3 This holding in effect requires the
chiropractor to make a medical diagnosis or stand liable for a failure to do
so, even though the court purports to apply the standards of the "school
of healing" rule. However, in Nelson v. Dah124 it was held that no negligence was shown where the plaintiff's intestate, who had a weak heart and
a goiter, sought relief from headaches and died from heart failure due to
toxemia, (namely, poison coming into the blood from the goiter) following chiropractic treatment. The court stated that the result in itself was
not enough to show negligence and that the failure to diagnose did not
indicate negligence, since the school of chiropractic limited its field of
operation to the spine and making the abnormal normal, which "could
seldom have harmful consequences." The holding of this court is in
accord with the line of cases in which the "school of healing" standard is
strictly followed, the reasoning being that chiropratic does not concern
itself with "diseases" or "diagnosis" thereof, but only with "adjusting" or
"subluxations."
In Wisconsin if the negligence relied upon for recovery is as to treatment only, the "school of healing" rule is followed and the standard of care
is that of the school of chiropractic; but if the negligence is in diagnosis as
22.

23.

24.

232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159, 25 N.C.C.A. 248 (1925).

See also, Beech v. Hunter, 14 Tenn.App. 188 (1931), as noted in 19 A.L.R.2d 1208,
in which the plaintiff was afflicted with Pott's disease, a tubercular eating away of
the vertebrae easily recognizable in its advanced stages. The defendant, who had
diagnosed the ailment as a misalinged vertebrae, was held liable for negligence in
failing to ascertain the cause of the patient's ailment.
174 Minn. 574, 219 N.W. 941 (1928).
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well as treatment, the standard of care is that of a recognized school of
medical profession.2 5 The reasoning of the Wisconsin court is that any
diagnosis is outside the scope of chiropratic practice; therefore the Wisconsin holding is an extreme application of the earlier-mentioned rule that
when a chiropractor acts outside the scope of his school of healing and
within the realm of medicine or surgery, he will be held to the standard of
care of a medical doctor.20 This reasoning may have been followed in a
recent Montana case in which the defendant was held liable for erroneously
diagnosing a brain tumor as two misplaced vertebrae.2 7 The court made
no mention of the "school of healing" rule as to the standard of care, or
of any exceptions thereto; but did cite the Wisconsin case2 s as authority
for its holding, and stated that no good reason exists why the law applied
to physicians, surgeons, dentists and the like, should not apply to chiropractors.
The Washington case of Kelly v. Carroll,29 was like the Carney case,
previously discussed, in that the defendant drugless healer was not of the
chiropractic school, but it may be important on the question of the liability
of chiropractors. In that case the defendant was a licensed drugless
healer-a sanipractor-and was held liable in a wrongful death action, the
court approving the trial court's refusal to instruct on the "school of
healing" standard of care. The negligence on which liability was predicated by the court was the failure of the defendant to advise other
treatment when he knew or should have known that his method was ineffectual. The court laid down four "basic propositions" as the premises of
its opinion: (1) a drugless healer is not a doctor; (2) drugless healers
cannot qualify as expert witnesses as to matters in the general realm of
medicine and surgery; (3) drugless healers do not belong to a school of
medicine; (4) one who does not have a license to practice medicine and
surgery is, nevertheless, liable for malpractice when he assumes to act as a
doctor, and is to be judged as if he were a doctor because of those acts.
Reasoning from these principles, the court held that the "school of healing"
standard is not applicable to drugless healers, and if the drugless healer
undertakes to treat a disease for which, in the highest level of medical
science, there is a generally recognized treatment he will be held to the
standard of care of the reasonably skilled and trained doctor of medicine
and surgery. The court further held that when a drugless healer knows
or should know that his method of treatment is not of a character produc25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Kuechler v. Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N.W. 1015, 31 A.L.R. 826 (1923).
Treptau v. Behrens Spa, 247 Wis. 438, 20 N.W2d 108, 19 N.C.C.A. N.S. 1 (1945);
and see Kuechler v. Volgnann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N.W. 1015, 31 A.L.R. 826 (1923),
holding that the practice of chiropractic does not include diagnosis.
Bakewell v. Kahle, 125 Mont. 89, 232 P.2d 127 (1951).
Kuechler v. Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N.W. 1015, 31 A.L.R. 826 (1923).
36 Wash.2d 482, 219 P.2d 79, 19 A.L.R.2d 1174 (1950), cert. den. 340 U.S. 892
(1950).
The defendant diagnosed the patient's complaint as a "reaction" and
treated him with hot and cold packs and "sine wave" treatments. After the twelfth
day the defendant advised the patient's wife to call in a physician. The doctor
diagnosed the ailment as appendicitis. The condition was so advanced that an
operation was delayed, and eight days later the patient died.
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tive of reasonable success, it is his duty to cease and to advise his patient
to seek other relief. The court stated that the healer may be found negligent
Linder this rule, although the patient knows that such healer belongs to a
school which will not use or advise the kind of treatment which is contended
should have been given or advised. This second holding of the Kelly case
was followed in the Carney case although in the latter case the court did
not indicate the standard of care against which the healer's conduct was
tested tinder this rule.
The state of Washington has a series of statutes regulating all authized forms of drugless healing except osteopathy and chiropratic, ' ° and a
separate series of statutes regulating the practice of chiropractic.' Therefore the Washington statutes cannot be looked to for support for the
abandonment of the "school of healing" standard, since it would seem that
if the court were to base its decision on the statutes, the regulation by the
legislature of healers according to their schools would lend support to the
"school of healing" rule rather than calling for abandonment of the
standard. Furthermore, the Utah case of Walkenhorst v. Kesler,32 cited
in the Kelly case, held the "school of healing" standard inapplicable to a
chiropractor on the ground that the regulatory statute did not recognize a
division of the healing arts into "schools of healing." The court in the
Kelly case, in holding that the "school of healing" standard was inapplicable,
stated: "Their qualities are so far inferior to those of a doctor that the law
will conclusively presume that they are not upon terms of equality which
would entitle their opinions to cancel out the best medical opinion available." In other words, this court is among those that hold the "school of
healing" standard inapplicable to drugless healers since they feel that
such healers, because of their limited qualifications and methods, are
dangerous as presently regulated and must be dealt with more strictly.
Squarely opposed, however, is a long line of cases which apply the general
33
rule that the standard of care is that of the defendant's own school.

In conclusion, it can be seen that apart from those cases in which
the treatment administered by the defendant is so violent or careless as to
constitute malpractice by the standards of any school of healing, the rules
concerning liability of chiropractors for malpractice vary considerably in
different jurisdictions. If it is the policy of the state to deal more strictly
30.
31.
32.

33.

Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat. § 10112 et seq. (1933).
Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat. § 10098 et seq. (1933).
92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), in which a cause of action was held to have been
sufficiently stated where the complaint alleged that the chiropractor had negligently
failed to properly diagnose the patient's condition as a broken hip, but informed
the patient that the pain he was suffering in his hip was merely rheumatism which
was caused by portions of the patient's spinal column being out of alignment;
and that the defendant failed to recognize symptoms of infections in the patient's
hip, but informed him that he had a mere boil on his hip and not to worry.
Chesney v. People, 121 Colo. 73, 212 P.2d 1011 (1949) (chiropractor); Ellinwood v.
McCoy, 8 CalApp.2d 590, 47 P.2d 796 (1935), (drugless healer); Hardy v. Dahl,
210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936), (naturopath); Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147,
263 Pac. 26, 56 A.L.R. 814 (1929), (osteopathic physisian); Grainger v. Still, 187
Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114, 70 L.R.A. 49 (1905), (osteophathic physician and surgeon).
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with the practice of drugless healing, the proper remedy does not lie in
holding the "school of healing" rule inapplicable to such schools of healing.
Most cases which so hold, although probably correct from the standpoint
of the "equities" involved, seem lacking in logical reasoning. It is submitted that the proper remedy lies in a revision of the statutes. A partial
solution to this problem may be the adoption of a statute similar to that
of Wisconsin which prohibits certain classes of drugless healers from
treating any specific disease except on the advice of a physician." A further
legislative solution would be the enactment of a "basic science act" requiring applicants for a chiropractic license to first pass an examination
in the basic sciences before they are permitted to be examined by the
chiropractic examining board.3 5 Although the Wyoming court has not yet
been confronted with the problem of the liability of chiropratcors for malpractice, it is submitted that the Wyoming statutes are in need of revision
so that if such a case does arise, the court would be relieved of the controversy concerning the merits of the various branches of the healing arts.
JERALD E. DuKEs

A STUDY OF THE WYOMING MISCEGENATION STATUTES
The first ban on interracial marriage was passed in Maryland in
1661.1 Since that time, forty states have followed with statutory bans on
interracial marriages. 2 Twenty-nine states still have such prohibitions.3
34.
?,5.

Wis. Stat. § 147.185 (1949).
The sciences generally considered as basic are anatomy, physiology, chemistry,
bacteriology and pathology. According to Memorandum, Bureau of Legal Medicine
and Legislation, American Medical Association (1950), eighteen of the states and
of the District of Columbia presently have such statutes. It is interesting to note
that neither California nor Wyoming, with their large ratios of chiropractors, have
such statutes.

1.

"Foreasmuch as divers free-born English women, forgetful of their free conditions,
and to the disgrace of our nation, do inter-marry with negro slaves, by which divers
suits may arise, touching the issue of such women, and a great damage doth befall
the master of such negroes, for preservation whereof for deterring such free-born
women from such shameful matches, be it enacted: that whatsoever free-born
woman shall intermary with any slave, from and after the last day of the present
assembly, shall serve the master of such slave during the life of her husband; and
that all the issues of such free-born women, so married, shall be slaves . . .
And be it further enacted: That all the issues of English, or other free-born women,
that have already married negroes, shall serve the master of their parents, till they
be thirty years of age and no longer." Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1637-1664,
pp. 533-534; see also, Brackett, The Negro in Maryland, pp. 32-33; Reuter, Race
Mixture, p. 78.
Alabama, Ala. Code § 14-360 (1940); Arizona, Ariz. Code Ann. §§ 63-107 and 63108 (1939) ; Arkansas, Ark. Stat. § 55-104 ( 1947) ; California, Cal. Civil Code § 60
(1937) (held unconstitutional in Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948);
Colorado, Colo. Stat. Ann. § 107-2 (1935); Delaware, Del. Code § 13-101 (1953);
Florida, Fla. Stat. §§ 1.01, 741.1!, 741.12 (1953); Georgia, Code of Ga. Ann. §§
53-106, 53-312 (1933) ; Idaho, Idaho Code § 32-206 (1947) ; Indiana, Burns, Ind. Stat.
Ann. §§ 44-104, 44-105 (1933) (Baldwin's Ind. Stat. Ann. § 5619 (1934)); Iowa
(omitted in 1851) ; Kansas (omitted Laws v. 49 (1857)); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 402.070 (1953); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. § 9-201 (1950); Maine, Act of 1786,
repealed by Laws 1883 p. 16; Maryland, Md. Flack's Code § 27-466 (1951); Massachusetts, repealed by Acts 1843 c. 5; Michigan, amended by Act 23, Session Laws

2.

